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A novel technique is devised to perform orthogonal state quantum key distribution. In this scheme,
entangled parts of a quantum information carrier are sent from Alice to Bob through two quantum
channels. However before the transmission, the orders of the quantum information carrier in one
channel is reordered so that Eve can not steal useful information. At the receiver’s end, the order
of the quantum information carrier is restored. The order rearrangement operation in both parties
is controlled by a prior shared control key which is used repeatedly in a quantum key distribution
session.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd,03.67.Hk
A complex telecommunication system connects any place at any time with pervasive intrusion in the world today. It
is trivial to observe that information security is a fundamental issue today. The task of cryptography is to make secret
messages intelligible only for the two legitimate parties of the secret communication, Alice and Bob, and unreadable
for other unauthorized users such as Eve. To this end, Alice and Bob have to encrypt their secret messages using
a suitable encryption scheme. Thus far, the only proven secure crypto-system is the one-time-pad scheme, in which
the secret key is as long as the messages [1, 2]. The security of the transmission of the secret messages using one-
time-pad depends ultimately on the key privacy. The security of key distribution is the most important part in
secret communication. Quantum key distribution (QKD), an approach exploiting quantum mechanics principles for
secret communication, provides a secure way for transmitting the key. A lot of attention has been focused on QKD
[3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17] since the BB84 QKD protocol [3], and experimental studies on QKD
have been developing very fast in the last two decades [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26].
The security of QKD lies on the fundamental difference between classical and quantum information. Classical
information can be copied freely and imperceptibley. However quantum information cannot be cloned [27]. Any
measurement will disturb the quantum state unless the quantum state is the measuring device’s eigenstate. For a
quantum state, Eve has only one chance to choose the right measuring device to avoid capture. The security of QKD
protocols lies either on randomness, e.g. in BB84 [3] and similar protocols [4, 5, 6, 7] or the non-locality nature of
quantum systems as in refs [8, 11, 13, 16].
Non-locality is pertinent to quantum system only. Here a quantum state is split into two parts: e.g. the two parts
of a photon wave packet [8, 11], or two correlated particles [13, 16]. We call them as quantum information carriers
(QIC). In non-locality based QKD protocols, orthogonal quantum states are used. Security is assured by not allowing
Eve to acquire both parts simultaneously. These protocols can be understood in Fig.1 in ref [8], which is similar to
Fig.1. Alice and Bob’s sites are secure, and the transmission lines are insecure. Alice produces EPR pairs randomly
in one of entangled states. She then sends out the two parts of a QIC simultaneously through two paths to Bob. The
lower QIC part is delayed first at Alice’s site, and the upper QIC part is sent away without delay. At Bob’s site, the
upper part has a delay and the lower part has not, so the two parts of the QIC arrive at the detector simultaneously
and are measured. These protocols use orthogonal states and have full efficiency; and all the particles transmitted
can be used to generate secret keys. In Goldenberg-Vaidman scheme [8], the time delay for the two correlated parts
is usually longer than the transmission time between the practical distance so that the first QIC part has already
reached Bob’s secure field when the second part starts to run into the insecure line. To assure the security, Alice
has to send the QIC in random timing. Koashi-Imoto protocol [11] uses an asymmetric interferometer instead of a
symmetric interferometer, and the random timing can be dropped and the time-delay can be reduced. However, two
factors make this delay cannot be too short. First there exists a detection time window for Eve in these protocols.
If Eve acquires the same apparatus as Bob, which is usually assumed in security analysis, she can take an intercept-
resend attack. She first intercepts a batch of lower QIC parts which reaches her first and stores them for a while,
at the same time she sends fake lower QIC parts to Bob. After delay time t, Eve begins to receive corresponding
upper QIC parts. Combining the QIC parts she keeps, she can make collective measurement and know the correct
key completely. Afterwards she can send the correct messages to Bob. It is only in this delay time that Eve makes
errors about the secret keys. Afterwards, Alice and Bob can only notice a backward shift of Bob’s key string relative
to Alice’s. Secondly, Eve can take advantages of noises in noisy channel to gradually make up this shift. If the delay
2time is not long, Eve can achieves this fairly quickly. Similar issues exist for other protocols that use orthogonal
states.
In this paper, we present a controlled order rearrangement encryption (CORE) technique for QKD with the state
of a correlated system, such as entangled photon pairs. Here Alice rearranges the order of correlated particles and
send them to Bob, and Bob then restores the order of the particles and recover the correct correlation and makes the
right measurement. This is done in a controlled manner by the repeated use of a short control key as has been used in
the modified BB84 scheme[7], where Alice and Bob synchronize their measuring devices by repeatedly using a prior
shared control key.
To present our idea clearly, we use EPR pairs as the QIC in the rest of this paper for the sake of simplicity. The
procedure and conclusions to other QIC’s are very much the same with little or without any modification. An EPR
pair can be in one of the four Bell states:
∣∣ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉A |1〉)B − |1〉A |0〉B , |ψ+〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉A |1〉B + |1〉A |0〉B)∣∣φ−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉A |0〉B − |1〉A |1〉B), |φ+〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉A |0〉B + |1〉A |1〉B) (1)
where subscripts A and B indicate the two correlated photons in each pair. They can represent 00, 01, 10 and 11
respectively. As in Fig.1, CORE technique uses two channels. Alice uses a modulator to prepare her EPR pairs
randomly in the four Bell-basis states, and then sends out them in equal time intervals to Bob. Before these EPR
pairs enter the insecure transmission lines, their orders are rearranged by a controlled-order-rearrangement-encryption
system. After they arrive at Bob’s site, they are de-arranged in Bob’s site that undoes the effect of order rearrangement
by Alice and then are measured. Fig.2 shows the main idea of CORE by a specific example. Here are four choices of
CORE operations. The CORE is done for every four EPR pairs. The upper QIC parts are transmitted according to
their temporal ordering. A control key is used to rearrange the order of particles in the lower channel. If the value
of control key is 00, operation E0 is applied and the order of the 4 EPR pairs are not changed as shown in Fig.2 (a),
which is implemented in the device in Fig.2 (b) with switches 1, 2 and 3 in positions (up, up, down) for all the 4 EPR
pairs. When control key is 01, E1 is performed, and it is done by putting the 3 switches into position (down, up,
down), (up, down, up), (up, down, down), (up, down, up) for the four particles respectively. Similar combinations
can be written explicitly for E2 and E3. After the order rearrangement, two particles that travel simultaneously
through the two channels have complicated relations: they are correlated if the CORE operation is E0, and they
are anti-correlated if the other 3 CORE operations are used. At Bob’s sites, we just exchange upper and lower part
of Alice’s CORE apparatus, and the CORE operation performed by Alice will be undone. After measurement, the
information is read out. It is interest to emphasize that the measurement here is orthogonal basis measurement. The
outcome is determinative, and is exactly the same as Alice has prepared.
To prevent Eve stealing the information of the encryption ordering operation, one needs an evening process to make
the time interval between different batches of QIC’s travel at equal time intervals.
Let’s look at the security of CORE. We suppose that Eve has complete knowledge of Bob’s measuring device except
the control key. As she does not know which CORE operation Alice and Bob are doing each time, she can only guess
randomly from the four CORE operations. Thus she has only 25% chance to choose the right CORE operation for
every 4 EPR pairs. When Alice uses the wrong CORE operation, the two photons she measures will be anti-correlated,
say the A particle from the first EPR pair and the B particle from the second EPR pair is mistreated by Eve as an
EPR pair, then the density operator will be
ρA1B2 = ρA1 ⊗ ρB2 =


1/4 0 0 0
0 1/4 0 0
0 0 1/4 0
0 0 0 1/4

 (2)
where ρA1 = TrB1(ρA1B1) and ρB2 = TrA2(ρA2B2) are the reduced density matrices of particle A1 and particle
B2, respectively. When ρA1B2 is measured in Bell-basis, the result can be any of the 4 Bell-basis states with 25%
probability each. Thus Eve will introduce 3/4 × 3/4=56.25% error rate in the results. Alice and Bob can detect Eve
easily by checking a sufficiently large subset of results randomly chosen.
Surely, Eve can even take Bell inequality measurement on the photons, but it is useless for decrypting the control
key. Let us choose two directions −→a (ax, ay, az) and −→b (bx, by, bz) as the directions of measurement of Alice and Bob
respectively. Then the correlation operator can be written as follow.
Ê = σ̂ · −→a ⊗ σ̂ · −→b (3)
3=


azbz az(bx − iby) (ax − iay)bz (ax − iay)(bx − iby)
az(bx + iby) −azbz (ax − iay)(bx + iby) −(ax − iay)bz
(ax + iay)bz (ax + iay)(bx − iby) −azbz −az(bx − iby)
(ax + iay)(bx + iby) −(ax + iay)bz −az(bx + iby) azbz

 (4)
where σ̂ is the Pauli operator, σx =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, σy =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
, σz =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
. The expectation value
〈
E(−→a ,−→b )
〉
ψ
=
〈ψ| σ̂ ·−→a ⊗σ̂ ·−→b |ψ〉 in state |ψ〉 is different for different Bell states. They are − (axbx + ayby + azbz), axbx+ayby−azbz,
−axbx + ayby + azbz and axbx − ayby + azbz in Bell states |ψ−〉, |ψ+〉, |φ−〉 and |φ−〉 respectively. For product states
|0〉 |0〉, |0〉 |1〉, |1〉 |0〉 and |1〉 |1〉, the expected values are azbz, −azbz, −azbz and azbz respectively. If Eve takes Bell
inequality measurement on two uncorrelated photons in the CORE repeatedly, she will get 0 for a large number of
measurements as the photons is randomly distributed in the four product states. If Eve does takes two correlated
photons, she will also get 0 as the EPR pair takes the 4 Bell states with equal probability. In fact, the violation of
Bell inequality holds for two photons in a a fixed Bell state. So Eve can get no information about the control key
except for guessing it randomly.
The control key is very important. Here we must emphasize that unlike classical one-time-pad, the control key for
CORE can be quite short and be used repeatedly. This is surprising to a conventional cryptographer because it is
well known that a one-time-pad key used twice will be of great danger. But it is a different story when quantum
mechanics comes into play. There are fundamental differences in encryption between classical signal and quantum
state. In classical encryption, signal can be copied freely and the copying process does not introduce error on the final
results. Eve can exploit this freedom to eavesdrop in classical communication. In quantum physics, quantum states
can be measured without disturbing the system only if they are eigenstates of the measuring operator. When Eve
tries to measure the states without knowing if she is using the eigenstate operator, she will produce errors most of the
time. The no-cloning theorem[27] forbids Eve to produce multiple copies to break the code by trial and error, and
she has only one chance for a quantum state! Different from classical cryptography, Eve has no means to decipher
the control key. She can only guess the control key randomly. The probability that Eve guesses the right control key
is (1
4
)Nk = (1
2
)2Nk , where 2Nk is the number of bits in the control key. When Nk=100, the probability is practically
zero. The security of the repeated use of a short control key has recently been proved[28]. It is shown that QKD
without public announcement of basis is secure against both individual and coherent attacks. The proof could be
applied to this CORE scheme with some modification. More detailed study needs be done to prove the security of
the CORE scheme.
The control key is short. A few hundreds bit is enough for many purposes. We can use a control key repeatedly
in a single QKD session. The control key can be produced in many ways. Any sequence of secret numbers can
be used as control key. They can be produced beforehand when Alice and Bob are in contact. But the preferred
generating method is to produce them on-sites using the same physical setup. Instead of simultaneously choosing the
same CORE operation, Alice and Bob choose their operation randomly. They record their results and the CORE
operation they use each time. They have 25% chance to choose identical CORE operations. In these events, they
should have identical results. After some transmissions, they publish their CORE operations, and retain those with
identical CORE operations. They then perform eavesdropping check. If the error rate is lower than a threshold, they
then conclude that their transmission is safe and then continue to perform he follow-up post-processing such as error
correction and privacy amplification. Then they have a common secret random numbers that can be used as the
control key. After the generation of the control key, Alice and Bob then switch to the synchronized operation CORE,
which is much more efficient. Actually, the on-site generation of the control key is a BB84-type protocol, and the
intrinsic is low. However, we need only to use this operation to generate a very short sequence key. The time it takes
is negligible compared to the main process of a QKD process.
The CORE technique is not only suitable for EPR pairs, but also suitable for other QIC’s. The formalism used here
can be directly translated into the wave-packet case as in refs [8, 11]. In that case, the experimental implementation
will be easier. In addition, CORE can be performed in groups. The control key can be used to control the CORE
operation of a group of units. For instance, instead of using 01 controls CORE operation of one unit of QICs(4 EPR
pairs) , one can use 01 to control the use of E1 for more units of QICs consecutively, say 4 units or 16 EPR pairs.
The specific example of CORE in this paper uses only four simple permutation operations. The idea presented here
can be easily extended to build more complicated systems. The essence of CORE technique is the repeated use of a
control key to perform classical encryption on the quantum system. The non-cloning nature of quantum state ensures
this technique viable.
Though genuine single photon source has been realized in laboratory[29, 30], at present highly attenuated laser
pulses is used to approximate single photon source where only 1 out of 10 pulse contains a photon. The detection
efficiency is not 100% either. As with other QKD schemes, we must perform eavesdropping check, and if the error rate
is less than threshold the results are taken as the raw key. After quantum error correction and privacy amplification,
4the raw key will be processed into ideal secret keys.
To summarize, CORE technique can be used to perform secure key distribution with present technology in a
controlled and efficient manner. It is worth mentioning, the discovery of security of repeated use of a short control
key[7] is very important. It enables quantum key distribution in a more efficient way.
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FIG. 1: Illustration of a typical QKD system with order rearranging encryption system.
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FIG. 2: A specific example of CORE with EPR pairs. (a) Four different CORE operations. (b) Device to perform CORE
operations. The loop represents a time delay of a fixed interval.
